Every Monday, I share my first take on 2 to 3 interesting opportunities.
Regular readers may ask, “Why only 2? Previously, you said 3 every week.”
The short answer: I abandoned an idea in Japan. Why? I will explain at the end.
To maintain flexibility, let’s switch to ‘2 to 3 ideas every Monday’. I don’t want to squeeze in a low-quality idea just to hit 3.
As usual, if you want me to dig deeper into an idea, vote for it. Use the poll at the end of this email.
Nine Entertainment Co. Holdings Limited (NEC AU)
About (21 Aug 2026)
Share price: AUD 0.97
Market capitalisation: AUD1,529 mn (USD 1,097 mn)
Enterprise value (EV): AUD 1,644 mn (USD 1,179 mn)
Average daily volume (ADV): AUD 4 mn (USD 3 mn)
NTM P/E: 10x
My initial estimate suggests ~14% free cash flow yield on enterprise value. ~9% premium over the Australian 10y government bond yield. Looks attractive.
NEC is Australia's largest media group.
It owns the Channel 9 television, major newspapers like The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and The Australian Financial Review (AFR).
During 2024, NEC’s share price collapsed. A toxic workplace culture scandal led to the departure of the news director, Chairman and CEO.
By early 2025, new management took over and stabilised operations. The share price rallied further after NEC sold its stake in Domain at a 60% premium.
It looks like today’s share price still has not fully reflected NEC’s most valuable asset.
Hidden asset?
NEC looks like a dying business. In H1’26, its revenue declined -5% YoY.
It is priced like a dying business. 10x NTM P/E.
But it is not a dying business.
NEC owns Stan, Australia’s homegrown streaming service. It is the 4th largest in Australia, and growing fast.
In H1’26, Stan grew revenue +15% YoY and EBITDA +24% YoY.
Time for napkin math.
Netflix, Inc. (NFLX 0.00%↑ US) trades at 23x LTM EV/EBITDA and 7x LTM EV/Revenue.
If we apply these multiples to Stan, this streaming service alone could be worth between AUD 1,600 mn and AUD 3,700 mn.
Of course, Stan is smaller than Netflix. But it is growing just as fast. We’ll refine our estimates later. For now, let’s just use the low end.
At the low end, Stan alone is worth about NEC’s enterprise value today (AUD 1,644 mn).
Will this hidden asset remain hidden?
Management has shown that they are reasonable capital allocators.
In 2025, NEC sold its 60% stake in Domain at a 60% premium to CoStar Group, Inc. (CSGP 0.00%↑ US) . Domain is one of Australia’s most popular real estate websites.
NEC then returned most of the windfall to shareholders through a big special dividend.
Yet, the consensus seems to have ignored this hidden asset.
It’s easy to dismiss NEC. Traditional media companies suffer secular decline. NEC’s largest segment, Television, is no exception.
During H1’26, Television revenue declined -14% YoY. This obscured Stan’s +15% revenue growth, causing group revenue to decline -5%.
That’s probably why this opportunity exists.
Takeover?
NEC’s largest shareholder has been gradually increasing its economic interest and voting power.
The WIN Group is an Australian regional media company.
It held 15% economic interest in November 2019, 18% in October 2022, and 25% in June 2024.
In February 2026, the WIN Group entered into swap transactions to increase its voting power from 20% to 23%. Its economic interest remained at 25%.1
In April 2026, the WIN Group lifted its economic interest from 26% to 27%.2
Factors to focus on
Growth potential at Stan? How much will it be worth to a private buyer?
Greggs plc (GRG LN)
About (21 Aug 2026)
Share price: GBP 18.38
Market capitalisation: GBP 1,874 mn (USD 2,557 mn)
Enterprise value (EV): GBP 2,312 mn (USD 3,156 mn)
Average daily volume (ADV): GBP 8 mn (USD 11 mn)
NTM P/E: 14x
I estimate 9% free cash flow yield on enterprise value. ~4% premium over UK 10y gilt. Looks attractive.
GRG is the top food-on-the-go retailer in the UK. It is best known for its sausage rolls, pastries, sandwiches, and coffee.
How one customer describe GRG:
Is it gourmet food? No.
Is it the best tasting food I’ve ever eaten? No…
Is it consistent, cheap, and available pretty much wherever I happen to be in the UK? Yes.3
Through 2025, the shares tumbled. Investors worry over slowing growth.
Like-for-like (LFL) sales growth decelerated to +2.4%, down from +5.5% in 2024. It looks like the UK has hit ‘peak Greggs’.4
How many more sausage rolls can the Brits eat?
Under-recognised growth?
Peak Greggs still looks far away.
The first indication came on 29 July 2026. H1’26 earnings exceeded expectations. Revenue grew +7% YoY. Profit before tax (PBT) grew 20% YoY.
Store cannibalisation?
No strong evidence yet. Despite growing store count by 1%, LFL sales growth remained stable at +2%.
No more whitespace?
Greggs is rolling out smaller store formats to reach underpenetrated areas. They call it Bitesize Greggs.
This just allows us to infill in areas that previously we didn't think we could put a site…
They are doing exceptionally well. From a sales perspective, they take very slightly less than an average full-sized shop. Not significantly, but very slightly.
And the returns currently are very good. What I would caveat it with is we've only got 4.
GRG CEO Roisin Currie5
Capital returns?
GRG just passed peak capex:
Source: GRG (2026)
Management committed to returning surplus cash:
Source: GRG (2026)
Silchester International owns ~5% of GRG.
This UK fund manager is known as a ‘quiet activist’. It prefers to engage with management privately. However, in extreme cases, Silchester may go public with its demands.6
Whatever the methods, Silchester’s priority seems to be getting companies to optimise capital allocation and pay out more to shareholders.
I wouldn’t be surprised if GRG announces more special dividends and/or buybacks.
Factors to focus on
Growth potential from Bitesize Greggs and wholesale to grocery partners?
Overseas growth opportunity?
GRG just opened a franchise store at Tenerife, targeting British tourists.
Management sounded pleasantly surprised at how well the locals have taken to the sausage rolls too.
Leopalace21 Corporation (8848 JP)
I abandoned this idea.
At first glance, it looks like a bargain. 8x NTM P/E. 21% free cash flow yield on enterprise value.
Leopalace21 is like WeWork, but for residential apartments. It enters into a master lease with an apartment owner, and then subleases the individual units. Most customers are corporate clients looking for worker housing.
Why did I abandon this idea?
Leopalace21 runs a highly leveraged business model, both financially and operationally. I will be surprised if it can sustainably trade above single-digit P/E.
Furthermore, the 21% FCF yield is not real. The true yield is much much lower.
Japan accounting standards (JGAAP) still do not require companies to bring leases onto their balance sheet. This will only start from April 2027.
That said, Leopalace is a potential takeover target.
In June 2026, Warburg Pincus bought Leopalace’s peer, J.S.B.Co.,Ltd. (3480 JP). The PE firm offered a 172% premium over its undisturbed share price.
There will likely be more deals.
In 2024, Warburg Pincus hired a former Goldman Sachs banker as head of Japan and co-head of Asia real estate. In 2025, Warburg Pincus opened its Tokyo office.7
Hikari Tsushin, Inc. (9435 JP) is a major shareholder in both Leopalace21 and J.S.B.
Vote for the best idea
If you want me to dig deeper into an idea, vote for it.
Coming up next
I will look deeper into Genting Malaysia Berhad (GENM MK) this week. This was the idea you voted the most interesting in my previous email.
GENM owns a casino monopoly in Malaysia (63% of revenue).
In December 2025, GENM won one of the only three New York full commercial casino licenses. Yet, investors seem to have ignored this growth opportunity.
But not its parent. In October 2025, parent Genting Berhad (GENT MK), offered MYR 2.35 per share to acquire all remaining shares it did not already own.
This ultimately failed.
Independent advisor Kenanga Group deemed the offer not fair and not reasonable. They assessed fair value between MYR 3.48 and MYR 3.77.
Today, GENM is trading at only MYR 1.70
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Published by Andrew Wong, ACA, CFA
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Disclaimer
This publication is for informational, educational, and entertainment purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or tax advice. The content herein is a record of my personal research and investment process, and all analysis, forecasts, and opinions expressed are solely my own.
I make no representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information provided. The stock market is highly volatile, and my forecasts, estimates, and assumptions may prove incorrect.
I am not acting as your financial advisor or fiduciary. You should not rely on any information in this publication to make investment decisions. Under no circumstances will I be held liable for any direct, indirect, or consequential losses or damages arising from your reliance on the content of this publication.
At the time of publication, I do not hold any positions in NEC AU and GRG LN, either long or short. I may change my views, predictions, or personal portfolio positioning at any time without notice.
Great coverage about Greggs. Nice cash generative, relatively defensive business. The issue as you correctly flagged is saturation of units. At some point they either try to expand in other regions or distribute the FCF. Assuming sales growth will be tracking UK inflation looks fairly valued on layer 1 metrics. Recently I researched Cake Box and they have an experiment unit opening in Paris.
Interesting take on NEC. I’ve overlooked it previously for similar reasons you mentioned… might actually go back and take a look