Yet another 3 interesting ideas
Malaysia's top credit bureau; UK's largest property website; World's largest luggage maker
Every Monday, I share my first take on 3 interesting ideas.
If you want me to dig deeper into an idea, vote for it. Use the poll at the end of this email.
Later this week, I will look deeper into NEXON Co., Ltd. (3659 JP). This was the idea voted the most interesting last time.
CTOS Digital Berhad (CTOS MK)
About (31 Jul 2026)
Share price: MYR 0.71
Market capitalisation: MYR 1,604 mn (USD 393 mn)
Enterprise value (EV): MYR 1,642 mn (USD 402 mn)
Average daily volume (ADV): MYR 5 mn (USD 1 mn)
NTM P/E: 17x
CTOS is Malaysia’s top credit bureau. It sells credit reports and credit scores to businesses and individuals.
My initial estimate suggests ~ 8% free cash flow yield on enterprise value (EV), an attractive premium of ~ 4% over the Malaysia 10y government bond.
Good business, temporary headwinds?
Look at the chart above. It shows the total return from CTOS vs iShares MSCI Malaysia ETF (EWM).
Around July 2024, CTOS’ share price started diverging from EWM.
It looks like CTOS sold off because revenue growth and margins declined more than expected. Revenue growth decelerated from +34% in 2023 to +17% in 2024 and to only +7% in 2025. Operating profit margin (OPM) fell from a high of 34% in 2023 to 30% in 2024, and then to 21% in 2025.
CTOS spent more on marketing to bring back growth. Revenue growth had decelerated to +7% in 2025.
After facing a High Court lawsuit over inaccurate data in March 2024 (which CTOS subsequently won on appeal)1, the company increased technology spending.
By Q1’26, the company had completed its cloud migration. In Q2’26, revenue growth had recovered to +10% YoY. OPM had stabilised at 21%.
CTOS now targets to improve operating profit margins by 3 to 6 percentage points (ppt) by 2028.2
Capital returns?
In July 2026, CTOS announced it will sell 10% of JurisTech, an enterprise fintech company. It will return the MYR 50 mn sales proceeds to shareholders through a special dividend and share buybacks.3 This is ~ 3% of today’s market capitalisation.
It seems like there will be more capital returns.
CTOS still has 39% stake in JurisTech. The company announced plans to eventually sell this stake.
Sale?
CTOS started selling more non-core assets recently. In December 2025, it sold its stake in Experian Malaysia. Now, the company is selling its stake in JurisTech.
It looks like CTOS’ largest shareholder is preparing to sell CTOS. Creador, a private equity (PE) firm, owns ~21% of CTOS.
Creador first bought a stake in CTOS in August 2014 through its second fund, Creador II. In April 2023, Creador rolled over its stake into Creador V at MYR 1.35 per share.4
Putting two and two together, the PE firm will likely want to sell CTOS at more than MYR 1.35. Given the 10 years standard life of a PE fund, any sale will likely happen within the next 5 years.
Factors to focus on
Probability and timing of recovery in revenue growth and margins?
Any under-recognised growth potential, especially in CTOS’ international segments?
Rightmove plc (RMV LN)
About (31 Jul 2026)
Share price: GBP 4.65
Market capitalisation: GBP 3,437 mn (USD 4,632 mn)
Enterprise value (EV): GBP 3,408 mn (USD 4,593 mn)
Average daily volume (ADV): GBP 22 mn (USD 29 mn)
NTM P/E: 14x
RMV is the largest property website in the UK.
Real estate agents and developers advertise their properties on RMV’s website. It holds ~ 80% market share by page views.
My initial estimate suggests ~ 6% free cash flow yield on EV. Despite only ~1% premium over the UK 10y gilt, it might still be attractive, given its growth potential.
Under-recognised growth?
RMV shares enjoyed a rally starting in late 2024.
REA Group Limited (REA AU) offered GBP 7.81 per share. RMV rejected it. According to RMV’s board, the offer was “unattractive”.5
Today, RMV is trading at only GBP 4.65.
On 7 Nov 2025, RMV warned that a major ramp-up in AI investments would slow profit growth in 2026. The shares fell -28%.
The shares continued falling like a brick earlier this year. SaaSpocalypse.
It still remains to be seen whether enough consumers will switch to shopping for their homes through AI chatbots. If RMV fails to incorporate AI features and reach functional parity, then growth will likely stall.
Given its AI investment plans, there is a good chance the consensus is overestimating the adverse impact from AI. In any case, RMV owns proprietary data on historical sales.
Management also highlighted that strategic growth areas like Commercial Property, Rental Services, and Mortgages remain under-penetrated. They guided to 20-30% growth in these areas for 2026.
Capital returns?
RMV announced last week that it expects to return over GBP 400 mn to shareholders by 31 July 2027, including share buybacks of ~ GBP 330 mn.6
GBP 400 mn is ~ 12% of today’s market capitalisation.
Takeover?
With NTM P/E ratio near all-time low, REA may try to buy RMV again.
PE firms may be attracted too. RMV generates a lot of cash, but has no significant debt.
Factors to focus on
In Apr 2026, some real estate agents sued RMV. They accused RMV of charging excessive fees.7 What is the probability of an unfavourable settlement, and the potential exposure?
In 2023, CoStar Group, Inc. (CSGP 0.00%↑ US) entered the UK market by acquiring RMV’s smaller rival, OnTheMarket.8 How will this change the competitive landscape?
Samsonite Group S.A. (1910 HK)
About (31 Jul 2026)
Share price: HKD 14.13
Market capitalisation: HKD 19,270 mn (USD 2,457 mn)
Enterprise value (EV): HKD 33,068 mn (USD 4,217 mn)
Average daily volume (ADV): HKD 66 mn (USD 8 mn)
NTM P/E: 10x
Samsonite is the largest luggage brand in the world.
My initial estimate suggests ~ 10% free cash flow yield on EV. This is an attractive ~ 5% premium over the US 10y Treasury bond.
Under-recognised growth?
Negative YoY revenue growth since Q2’24 has led the market to price Samsonite like a no-growth or shrinking business. However, Samsonite is not a dying business.
Samsonite’s advantage of scale and strong brand recognition will allow it to grow in line with industry (3% to 5% p.a.).
The industry is competitive. Not much product differentiation can be achieved because components are quite standard and mostly sourced from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Innovation can be copied. Therefore, the most important moats are volume and brand.
Samsonite has both.
Good business, temporary headwinds?
Negative growth is likely cyclical rather than structural.
Between 2021 and 2023, Samsonite grew its revenue strongly because COVID-19 lockdowns ended and travel resumed. In 2024, revenue growth decelerated and turned negative. Having bought new luggage after lockdowns, people no longer needed that many new bags.
According to a former employee, the average luggage replacement cycle is 3 to 4 years. This meant revenue growth should inflect in 2026/2027, driven by the replacement of luggage bought in 2021/2022.
Indeed, YoY revenue growth has just turned positive. +2% in Q4’25 and +4% in Q1’26.
Hidden asset?
TUMI’s growth is obscured by other brands.
TUMI is Samsonite’s premium brand. Since 2017, group revenue grew 0.3% p.a. but TUMI grew 3.0% p.a.
First, TUMI’s premium positioning shields it from fierce competition. The only competitor of significance in the premium segment is Rimowa. Both are similar in size in terms of revenue. TUMI avoids head-on competition by positioning itself slightly below Rimowa.
Second, TUMI is growing in Asia but looks underpenetrated. TUMI earns only 28% of its revenue from Asia, compared to 60% in North America.
Takeover?
In March 2024, Bloomberg reported Samsonite received early indications of a potential takeover from multiple PE firms like Carlyle, CVC, KKR and DCP.9
The deal did not materialise, apparently because the price demanded was too high for the PE firms. Samsonite decided to proceed with a dual listing in the US instead.
Today, Samsonite still hasn’t achieved dual listing. Such a long time lag makes me wonder whether they are delaying the dual listing to consider another takeover interest.
There seems to be a motivation to sell.
The ex-chairman of the board is also the single largest individual shareholder. Timothy Charles Parker is already more than 70 years old. In his previous roles, he has extensive ties with PE firms, especially CVC.
Factors to focus on
Probability and timing of recovery
TUMI’s growth potential in Asia
Inventory days ~ 5.6 months, near historical median. Is this an issue? Will this weigh on future margins?
Vote for the best idea
If you want me to dig deeper into an idea, vote for it.
Coming up next
I will look deeper into NEXON Co., Ltd. (3659 JP) this week. This was the idea you voted the most interesting in my previous email.
Nexon looked like a value trap. Cash averaged ~170% of revenue over the past 10 years. But this is changing. The new CEO is returning more capital to shareholders.
In total, for 2026, Nexon will return ~ 4% of its market capitalisation or ~ 8% of enterprise value.
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Published by Andrew Wong, ACA, CFA
In case you missed it
Last week, I explained why I shortlisted ENN Energy Holdings Limited (2688 HK). The major shareholder shelved plans to privatise ENN Energy because of regulatory delays. Offer was HKD 80 per share. The shares now trade at ~ HKD 47.
Evergrande’s collapse was actually predictable. No need for site visits. Just read the annual reports. In my previous post, I highlighted the red flags in Evergrande’s annual reports: aggressive capitalisation of interest expense and rising payable days.
Disclaimer
This publication is for informational, educational, and entertainment purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or tax advice. The content herein is a record of my personal research and investment process, and all analysis, forecasts, and opinions expressed are solely my own.
I make no representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information provided. The stock market is highly volatile, and my forecasts, estimates, and assumptions may prove incorrect.
I am not acting as your financial advisor or fiduciary. You should not rely on any information in this publication to make investment decisions. Under no circumstances will I be held liable for any direct, indirect, or consequential losses or damages arising from your reliance on the content of this publication.
At the time of publication, I am long 1910. I do not hold any positions in CTOS and RMV, either long or short. I may change my views, predictions, or personal portfolio positioning at any time without notice.