Global Equities

Global Equities

Li Ning: China’s Top Sportswear at ~10% FCF Yield

Downturn will likely be less severe than expected. Overlooked long-term growth potential in overseas markets

Angsana Anderson's avatar
Angsana Anderson
Oct 08, 2026

[Shortlist] Li Ning Company Limited (2331 HK)

You highlighted a potential opportunity in Li Ning. What’s your suggestion?

Shortlist Li Ning.

The shares sold off after H1’26 earnings. Management cut revenue and margin guidance for 2026, driven by weak demand.

Today, the shares are trading at ~10% FCFF yield. The market seems to be pricing in another long and severe downturn, like the one from 2011 to 2017.

However, the current headwind will likely be less severe than expected. A detailed analysis of inventory and receivable reveal a good business that’s much healthier than expected.

Furthermore, investors are too focused on short-term earnings. They are overlooking the inflection point in Li Ning’s growth in international markets.

Liquidity?

8 Oct 2026

Share price: HKD 12.26

Market capitalisation: HKD 31,935 mn (USD 4,069 mn)

Enterprise value (EV): HKD 16,650 mn (USD 2,121 mn)

Average daily volume (ADV): HKD 303 mn (USD 39 mn)

NTM P/E: 9x

What does Li Ning do?

Li Ning sells sportswear under its own brand, mainly in mainland China.

It earned CNY 30 bn revenue in 2025 (+3% YoY):

  • 49% footwear (+2% YoY)

  • 42% apparel (+2%)

  • 9% equipment and accessories (+13%)

Li Ning sells through these channels:

  • 47% wholesale (+6% YoY)

  • 30% e-commerce (+5%)

  • 22% direct (-3%)

  • 1% international (-20%)

How has its market share trended?

Historically, consumers viewed Li Ning as inferior to Western brands like Nike and Adidas.

This changed in 2021.

The Xinjiang controversy caused consumer preference to shift towards local brands.

Li Ning gained significant market share. It held the gains after consumers discovered its products are as good as Western brands.

Source: Angsana Anderson estimates based on Topsports (6110 HK), Pou Sheng (3813 HK), Li Ning (2331 HK) and others

Good business, temporary headwinds

Why do you think the market is likely wrong to price in another long and severe downturn, like the one during 2011 - 2017?

The 2011 – 2017 downturn was caused by management significantly overestimating post-Olympic demand.

When the demand surge unexpectedly cooled off, Li Ning was stuck with too much inventory. Growth plummeted. Margins collapsed as the company cut prices to clear excess inventory.

The current headwind will likely be less severe than expected. Compared to 10 years ago, inventory today is much healthier.

Provision for inventory write-down measures the percentage of inventory whose selling price has fallen below cost. In H1’26, this remained low and stable at 5.9%. 10 years ago, it was 12.9%.

Inventory aging remains healthy in H1’26.

New products make up 77% of inventory, significantly higher than the 56% in 2016.

More importantly, obsolete products remain near all-time low at 5%.

Ok. We’ve discussed these before.

Inventory at Li Ning may be healthy. But how about channel inventory?

Channel inventory also looks healthy.

New products make up 84% of inventory. Only 6% of inventory is obsolete.

Both % remained stable in H1’26.

Finally, turnover in channel inventory also remains healthy and stable at ~ 4 months.

What is the risk of channel stuffing?

Low risk.

If this is happening, channel inventory would deteriorate, customers would take longer to settle invoices and refunds would increase. No indicators of these so far.

Trade receivables aging remains healthy.

Refund liabilities remain low and stable too.

Under-recognised growth

Why are investors overlooking Li Ning’s growth potential?

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